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Examining the assumptions of Integrated Coastal Management: Stakeholder agendas 
and elite cooption in Babuyan Islands, Philippines 
 
Abstract 
In the Philippines, Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) represents the dominant response to 
narratives of ecosystem decline. However, there are persistent challenges to implementation, 
manifested in continued resource degradation, questioning of the exercise of stakeholder 
involvement and rising resource conflicts. This paper examines the implementation process 
and how the assumptions embodied in the ICM regime meet the local reality in one group of 
islands in the Philippine archipelago. The evidence shows how the transformation towards a 
supposed equilibrium state of coastal ecosystems is undermined in the face of diverging 
stakeholder agendas. Expected actors are disempowered by the incoherence between the 
policy owners’ worldview and reality, paving the way for unethical influence from elite 
alliances. This is coupled with a deepening of the dominance of state, international 
development banks, foreign aid agencies, and NGOs in promoting their respective interests. In 
localities such as the Babuyan Islands, when assumptions of ICM collapse it has destructive 
consequences for fisherfolk and the coastal environment. We conclude that if ICM is to foster 
an effective and equitable correction of current unsustainable exploitation patterns, then there 
is a need to institute improved accountability mechanisms in the devolved governance system 
as well as taking seriously the espoused commitment to stakeholder involvement in 
determining the goals and assumptions of ICM. 
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1. Philippines Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) 
The national response in the Philippines to narratives of coastal ecosystem decline and 
degradation has been the institutionalisation of the Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) 
paradigm [1, 2]. Building on former coastal resource management (CRM) programs, ICM 
aims to reverse ecological degradation through rehabilitation, reforestation and restocking in 
coastal zones. The ICM policy regime espouses a procedural shift towards increased 
stakeholder participation and balanced employment of coercive and non-coercive policy 
instruments [3, 4, 5]. This ambition mirrors the global trend in environmental governance and 
management towards exploring a more diverse set of policy instruments, comprising mixtures 
of regulation, voluntary measures and economic instruments [e.g. 6]. The 2006 Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, in the chapter on marine and coastal ecosystems, recommends both 
ICM and stakeholder participation in decision making as one of the response options for 
policy makers to current resource degradation [7]. 
 
The establishment and promotion of the ICM regime and co-management is located in a 
regional South East Asian government trend towards decentralisation and devolution in 
resource management. The Philippine Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 (Republic Act 
7160) is featured as the most ambitious and complex system of law and programme of 
devolution of government authority in the country [3]. It devolves management of municipal 
waters to the Local Government Unit (LGU) with a consequent localization of fisheries 
governance and with general fiscal autonomy of the LGU. It thus embodies the result of a 
transition from central to local authority over management measures, where the municipality 
is the primary unit of government [8, 9]. The LGC is seen as having paved the way for the 
opportunity to form formal partnerships between LGUs, NGOs (Non-Governmental 
Organizations) and POs, (Peoples’ Organizations), where the local chief executive, often the 
mayor, through the municipal legislative council (Sangguniang Bayan or SB) can allocate 
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funds to NGOs and POs [10, 11]. The Municipal SB and barangay (village) SB are the 
legislative councils for the two lowest levels of government, to which representatives are 
elected every 4 years.  
 
The ICM co-management approach builds on pioneering efforts in community-based coastal 
resource management converting unregulated open access into co-management regimes [12, 
2, 3]. Different narratives exist to explain these community-based initiatives. Many initiatives 
of communities and national civil society groups are seen to emerge in the tradition of social 
mobilization (“people power”) after years of suppression during the Marcos era [e.g. 13]. The 
specific proliferation of environmental NGOs after the martial law regime under Marcos, has 
been explained as a consequence also of international donor interventions promoting ICM and 
the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). Some community based management 
initiatives in upland agricultural communities were later pioneered in marine reserves by 
Siliman University and subsequently by a large number of NGOs [14].  
 
Development banks, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) and the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) frequently seek to enhance the 
coordination and integration of what is seen as scattered community-based initiatives [e.g. 
15]. Local initiatives are evaluated in the light of the expectations from the national ICM 
regime, e.g. through awarding municipalities for ‘best practice CRM’ [16]. In community 
programs, local people are considered as public ‘guardians’ and ‘stewards’ of the 
environment, a rationale which has also entered the National Integrated Protected Areas 
System (NIPAS) regime Law in 1992 and the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) in 1997 
[17]. Pollnac and Pomeroy [18] describe how more than 100 known community based 
projects have been carried out since 1980. 
 
The official ICM project cycle emphasises broadened stakeholder involvement, multi-sector 
collaboration and the leadership of local governments [12]. The paradigm is often presented 
as a reaction to former command-and-control management, and the colonial imprint on 
Philippine natural resource management. Under Spanish rule and American administration, 
state-led centralized schemes led to dissolution of common property regimes in the provinces 
and de facto unregulated open access in many coastal waters [20, 21, 19]. Eisma et al. [22] 
and Pomeroy et al. [23, p. 655] thus interpret the ICM regime as a governance shift from 
regulatory and controlling measures to ‘a broader approach that recognizes fisher’s 
participation, local stewardship, and shared decision-making in the management of fisheries’.  
 
However, despite the promotion of ICM, the Philippines continues in recent years to face a 
significant decline in the fisheries sector of more than 25% in its contribution to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), and the management of declining near shore fisheries have led to 
rising resource conflicts. This has stimulated calls for urgent, concerted action from a number 
of government agencies and international bodies [e.g. 24, 15]. The degradation of coastal 
resources through destructive and excessive resource use mirrors trends in the wider South 
East Asian region, where scientists are arguing for a vital need for improved concerted action 
at various institutional levels to halt the decline in fish stocks [e.g. 25]. Further, there is an 
increasing questioning of the exercise of stakeholder involvement in the ICM regime. 
Stakeholder participation in programmes is low and formal recognition of community 
organizations is problematic [25, 19]. 
 
With this understanding of the ICM regime as the point of departure, this paper examines the 
practical implementation of its goals and underlying assumptions in one group of islands in 
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the Philippine archipelago. The analysis is based on evidence from a case study in 
conservation action planning carried out through a stakeholder dialogue from November 2007 
until May 2008 in the Babuyan group of islands, located at 121° 36’ E and 19° 18’ N, 
bounded by the Balintang and Babuyan Channels in northern Philippines (Fig. 1). The 
concrete objective of the dialogue was to develop an adaptive conservation action plan for the 
Babuyan Islands, focusing specifically on Camiguin Island. The project was originally 
proposed as a spin-off of a previous project initiated by Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas 
(KKP) or World Wide Fund for Nature - Philippines (WWF-Philippines), and was entitled 
‘Science and Community-based conservation of Humpback Whales and other cetaceans in the 
Babuyan Islands, Philippines’. Inspired by previous efforts by WWF, the project contained 
four core activities: Cetacean survey with photo-identification, rapid coral and fisheries 
assessments, and conservation planning. The survey and two assessments provided scientific 
inputs to the planning process [26]. 
 
Fig. 1 here. 
 
The waters around the Babuyan Islands, particularly Camiguin Island, were verified in 1999 
as the only known breeding ground for humpback whales in the Philippines [27]. Vessel 
surveys conducted around the five main islands since 2000 sighted 12 other cetacean species 
living in these waters [28]. A number of conservation projects have been implemented, 
including investigating and monitoring of whale stocks and other biodiversity in the islands 
and recommending the establishment of protected areas regulated by provincial and municipal 
ordinances [29, 30]. In 2000, WWF initiated the Humpback Whale Research and 
Conservation Project (HWRCP) in the Babuyan Islands. As part of the HWRCP, WWF 
facilitated a conservation planning process which in October 2001 led to the formulation of a 
first conservation action plan [24]. In 2003, motivated by the research conducted by WWF, 
Provincial Ordinance 09-2003 was passed declaring the humpbacks a protected species within 
the jurisdiction of the province of Cagayan [31]. After WWF pulled out, the only conservation 
NGO present in Calayan Municipality is Isla Biodiversity Conservation Foundation Inc. who 
from 2006 has taken the leadership in involving other stakeholders in biodiversity 
conservation in Calayan Island [32].  
 
Cagayan Province is now seeing the implementation of a six-year ICRM initiative funded by 
the Global Environment Fund (GEF), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Government of 
the Philippines (GoP), as part of the Country Strategy and Program for Philippines in five 
regions which have not yet benefited from CRM programmes [33]. This is the latest of a 
series of major international bilateral or multilateral donor assisted projects with matching 
funds from the national government, of which Balgos [1] lists 10 implemented since 1980. A 
preceding one, the USAID and GoP sponsored Coastal Resource Management Project 
(CRMP), institutionalised the ICM worldview in a benchmark system for CRM planning in 
2001, which was subsequently adopted by the Philippine government [3]. 
 
2. Research approach and methodology  
The conservation planning was facilitated as a process of social learning. Social learning is an 
alternative policy instrument to environmental problems which views policy itself as a form 
of praxis, in that it does not exist in isolation from its implementation [34]. This is based on a 
growing recognition that efforts for sustainable development under conditions of complexity 
and uncertainty encounter a lack of agreement on what comprises the exact resource problem 
and its possible solutions. Environmental ‘problems’ are therefore instead approached as 
resource ‘dilemmas’, which are characterised by the existence of multiple legitimate 
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perspectives on what constitutes the actual problem and its solutions [35]. Resource dilemmas 
are characterised by subtractability, i.e. that the management utilises and draws upon a 
number of finite financial, social and ecological resources; multiple stakeholders with 
potentially competing claims for the resources; high levels of controversy, uncertainty and 
complexity, and interdependency between stakeholders’ perspectives, behaviours and actions 
[36]. Just as the ICM paradigm, social learning thus rejects the command-and-control 
approach which ‘implicitly assumes that the problem is well bounded, clearly defined, 
relatively simple and generally linear with respect to cause and effect’ [37, p. 329] and argues, 
with Ludwig, that this ‘management paradigm fails when confronted with complex problems’ 
[38, p. 758].  
 
A range of theoretical frameworks has been developed in which social learning is approached 
within a positivist-realist epistemology where it is assumed that the manager and/or researcher 
can position her/himself outside the system of interest and define what exactly constitutes 
improvement. However, the approach to social learning used in this planning process relied 
on a constructionist epistemology or sociology of knowledge in the empirical science tradition 
[39] which appreciates that human knowledge emerges through people’s social interactions 
and multiple levels of feedback between stakeholders [40].  
 
The methodology of Dialogical Boundary Critique [41] was integrated into a participatory 
stakeholder planning process guided by Soft Systems Methodology [42] to stimulate creative 
thinking about how current stakes are constructed, potential conflicts of interests, scenarios 
for change, and collective actions [43]. The dialogue followed a methodological pluralism, 
drawing on communicative tools suitable for the specific meeting or consultation [44], 
including Venn diagram, mind mapping, brainstorming, force field analysis. The planning 
process consisted of different facilitated forms of interaction, including workshops, open 
space meetings, focus groups, semi-structured interviews, and informal conversations (for 
details on the methodology see Larsen [45]). 
 
The back bone of the planning process was a series of planning workshops in Camiguin and 
Calayan Islands, and in Tuguegarao City, the capital of Cagayan Province. In addition, 
individual consultations with key informants explored questions which emerged from the 
workshops. Close to 100 people participated in these workshops. The interviews comprised 
11 people from the three Camiguin villages (barangays) (Legislative Council members 
(Kagawads), farmers, fisherfolk, parish ministers); 4 people from the LGU (SB members and 
administrators); 6 senior officials from the Provincial Government Unit (PGU) (from offices 
of environment, agriculture and tourism); 9 officials from the regional representations of line 
agencies DENR and BFAR (directors, programme leaders and field staff); and 4 NGO staff 
(local and national). The planning process was implemented in two rounds, the first taking 
place November 25th to December 6th 2007 in mainland Cagayan, the second implemented 
May 4th to16th 2008, in Camiguin and Calayan Islands, and in Tuguegarao City. In the 
intermittent period between the two rounds, the marine research activities of the project took 
place, and the outcomes were fed into the second round of planning interactions.  
 
Below, the results from the planning process is presented in a narrative form by means of the 
mnemonic soft systems tool referred to as TWOCAGES [46] (see Box 1). In the discussion 
below, the notions which comprise this framework are used to analyse the findings. The 
narrative begins with an outline of the worldview embodied in the ICM regime, notably the 
assumption of the existence of balanced coastal ecosystem equilibrium state, which can be 
defined by the policy owners and experts. It then examines how the expected actors are 
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disempowered due to the collapse of the owners’ worldview in the face of diverging 
stakeholder agendas and local innovation from resourceful elites. 
 
Box 1 here. 
 
3. Results and analysis 
 
3.1 Worldview and Owners: Preserving an ideal ecosystem balance  
Whilst spearheaded by NGOs, the coastal management activities in Babuyan Islands are to a 
large part supporting the protection and rehabilitation of coastal biodiversity, sanctioned by 
the central government, most notably the DENR and BFAR, who thus are the owners of the 
transformation promoted by ICM. The underlying worldview of this process is structured 
around the aim of rehabilitating and protecting coastal ecosystems to maintain or recover an 
ideal, assumed equilibrium, ecosystem state with optimal diversity and richness of 
biodiversity for the benefit of poor fisherfolk. In this section, this assumption and its 
significance will be outlined. 
 
The 1987 Philippine Constitution explicates the ‘right to having a balanced and healthy 
ecology’ of the nation’s marine wealth. The LGC stipulates the responsibility of local 
government units to ‘manage and maintain ecological balance within their territorial 
jurisdiction’ [15]. The Fisheries Code (Republic Act 8550) of 1997 (p. 162) institutionalizes 
the goals of maintaining a sound primordial ecological balance and stipulates the details of 
autonomy and mandates of different users and management authorities in relation hereto. The 
ArcDev Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development, developed from 
the National Marine Policy with assistance from UNDP, departs from similar equilibrium 
based theory in using the notion of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). It argues that MSY 
has been exceeded and that the State is obligated to ensure goals of poverty alleviation and 
livelihoods within ‘ecological limits’ and ‘optimal utilization’ [48, p. 163] (for details on 
‘equilibrium based management’ see Powell [49]). 
 
In these articulations it is assumed that the boundaries around what constitutes the desirable 
stable state of the ecosystem, including the degree of overfishing and degradation, can be 
determined via expert knowledge, e.g. prescription of biological sciences. Problem definitions 
of ’biological overfishing’ is thus a common starting point for management plans, and target 
areas are chosen according to priority ecosystem and biodiversity corridors as identified by 
biodiversity science [33]. Plan International draws on an Ecosystem Approach to enforce the 
NIPAS zoning rules for ecosystems [50]. In the management of the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea, WWF 
is inserting and popularising the notion of Ecoregion as a biogeographic unit of management 
[51]. Ecologically defined boundaries are also evoked in the classification of the national 
legislation for the delineation of coastal areas into management zones [52]. This is also the 
case in the ArcDev Framework, which despite claimed to be rooted in ‘traditional society’, 
has priority actions defined according to scientifically defined ecosystems.  
 
Mainstream conservation planning frameworks thus draw on the international tradition of 
expert-led and science-driven systematic conservation planning, legitimated through bio-
geographical research and data. It attempts to optimise conservation efforts, e.g. 
representativity of species richness and persistence over time [53, 54] and is also inspired by 
the tradition of expert-based monitoring in marine fisheries management [55, 56]. Such 
planning and results-based frameworks support the fundraising strategies for the NGOs to 
attract financial support in competitive economic environments [57]. However, as will be 
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apparent below, this tradition creates the risk that articulations for stakeholder involvement 
contribute to integrate public discourse into coastal zone management through paternalistic 
expert decisions rather than opening coastal management to public discourse [58].  
 
In the articulations of the scientific ecosystem management paradigm a metaphysical ontology 
of nature is evoked which is not disputable [59]. ICM inserts the ‘coastal’ as a valid unit for 
organising and integrating knowledge for the purpose as it is made meaningful in the 
worldview of its owners and in relation to their interests. The definition of what comprises the 
desirable and optimal stable state of the ecosystem is frequently determined based on 
economic calculations and accruements which can be derived for the government or business 
partners. This reflects that fishery is an economic sector of great importance for the Philippine 
state, corporations and the trade partners.  
 
In the ArcDev Framework this economic value is coupled to interests of territorial integrity, 
national security and enforcement of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). The preferential use of coastal resources is therefore regulated with the goal to 
attain MSY of resource harvest aiming at maximising economic benefits, resource rents and 
economic yield. The Fisheries Code overlays the ecosystem classification with a system of 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), which aims at distinguishing between municipal (artisanal, 
small scale, traditional) and commercial (or large scale) fishing, which is carried out with 
different gear and vessel sizes. Only municipal fishing is allowed in the coastal zone, i.e. 
within the 15km boundary of the coastline [9, 19].  
 
3.2 Collapse of the policy owners’ worldview and disempowerment of expected actors 
In Babuyan Islands, the implementation of the ICM regime encounters a challenge in 
negotiating progress in the face of significantly diverging perspectives and agendas amongst 
actors and clients. A 4th class municipality in the national poverty ranking, the constituents 
depend mainly on small-scale fisheries and backyard farming for their livelihood. The 
municipal elite does not take interest in humpback whale issues or other biodiversity 
conservation issues for that matter, and directs preferential attention to tourism development, 
a process in which conservation objectives must be aligned accordingly. Outsider’s 
interventions are often met with general apprehension from the municipal elite who express 
that NGO or line agency intervention challenge the LGU autonomy under the LGC. NGO 
emphasis on whale conservation thus reflects a predetermined problem definition based on a 
strong conservationist perspective which excludes the municipal government. The 
prioritization of the LGU has in recent years been on production and suffers from an absence 
of coastal resource management planning and an under-resourced planning office. Previous 
conservation efforts in the islands have produced a contentious relationship and decreasing 
trust between the elite and ‘outsiders’. Disputes regarding responsibilities for combating 
illegal resource use such as dynamite and cyanide fishing, metal salvaging from shipwrecks 
and its impact on whale and fish stocks have reached media attention, further aggravating the 
interpersonal relations between stakeholders.  
 
Line agencies are expected to support the LGU in the implementation of the transformation 
process embodied in ICM. However, mainland agencies are rarely engaged in the Babuyan 
Islands. The legislative framework stipulates that line agencies can only support the LGU 
upon being formally approached by the municipal government. Collaboration is further 
constrained by the remoteness of the islands as well as the tense relationships outlined above. 
Most agency staff have never visited the islands, and service delivery and programme 
implementation is limited to brief field visits. This is further complicated by the fact that the 
 
 7 
different components of the ICM policy framework remain ambiguous and un-harmonised in 
theory as well as in implementation [52]. Conflicting and overlapping policies and lack of 
common sanctioning of mandates are derailing coordinated action amongst government 
bodies [15, 4, 18]. This is considered to lead to jurisdictional tangles between the main 
implementing agencies, i.e. DENR and BFAR [60]. In sum, most of the coastal municipalities 
in Cagayan have not yet initiated the participatory resource assessment in collaboration with 
DENR which is the first step in the coastal resource management planning process.  
 
The 15km boundary which delineates municipal waters for non-commercial fisherfolk from 
the marine economic zone of the Philippines is, as other centralised planning measures [21, p. 
402], experienced as an unrealistic boundary drawn by the policy owners to reorganize 
municipal resource management. As has been observed elsewhere [12], resources are not 
available for local government to enforce this boundary. There is no Philippine Maritime 
Police representation in Camiguin Island and the Philippine Coast Guards are without basic 
equipment such as patrol boat or binoculars. Poaching foreign vessels most often manage to 
avoid the Filipino patrol boats due to their modern equipment and the vastness of the ocean. 
The LGU presence in Camiguin is mainly by mobile texts messages and only in the most 
urgent cases the Philippine National Police (PNP) officers are sent to the island.  
 
There are also concerns that national policies lack clarity in implementing guidelines which 
complicate their application. This, in turn, shifts the responsibility to the municipal and 
barangay legislative process to enable local policy implementation. However, most municipal 
ordinances have remained unchanged for decades, and democratic procedures enshrined in the 
LGC to effect local governance, e.g. public hearings and Barangay Development Planning, 
are not practiced. In the islands, law enforcement is – as elsewhere – characterised by 
‘political interference and discretionary prosecution’ [22, p. 350] and widespread rumours of 
remittances of bribes. Whilst the PNP is a national line agency, in isolated localities such as 
the Babuyan Islands, the national linkage can be broken and the PNP staff are seen in effect 
be under the authority of the highest bidder. Moreover, government officials have a low trust 
in the efficacy of public meetings citing that dialogues are held with a lack of political 
commitment from chief executives who delegate junior staff and rarely participate personally 
in the discussions. 
 
The conservation NGO Isla is experiencing lacking interests from municipal and barangay 
officials, and the previously developed WWF-led humpback whale conservation action plan 
has not been implemented. Meanwhile, sustainability problems have grown; including 
encroaching on prohibited protected areas, use of illegal fishing equipment such as 
compressor diving, cyanide and dynamite, as well as pebble and shell collection, illegal 
logging and slash-and-burn farming (kaingin). Several of these practices pose severe human 
health and safety risks. Metal salvaging from ship wrecks started initially with walls and 
sidings but has now moved to main frames, which require larger amounts of explosives. This 
practice destroys the shelter of various species of fish and other animals and marine life on the 
seabed in the wreck’s vicinity as well as disturbs the breeding and nursing ground of whales. 
In addition to the local offences, Taiwanese fishing vessels are frequently seen hiring local 
residents for the poaching in municipal waters with long-line fishing and lobster cages. The 
catch of highly priced yellow fin tuna is a particular incentive for these practices.  
 
3.3. Unethical exerting of influence by elites 
The collapse of the owner’s worldview and disempowerment of the expected actors pave the 
way for the formation of stakeholder alliances through creative formal and informal 
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connections between different levels of government, political parties, families/clans, and 
organizations. Their main purpose is to enhance the access to and control over natural capital 
which in the absence of an effective management regime can be converted into financial 
assets. Tuna fishing, which originated as a formal fishery in the 1960s, is one of the high 
income fisheries in Asia [9], and national and international investors are important indirect 
actors as well as beneficiaries. Throughout the country, several examples exist where 
municipal elites open their waters to foreign vessels to benefit from external cash flows. 
Camiguin fisherfolk described how in particular Taiwanese vessels recruit locals in Babuyan 
Islands to work for them as guides.  
 
Also, the growing tourism industry is an arena for competition between different alliances. A 
national survey by Women in Travel ranked Cibang Cove of Calayan Island as third in terms 
of potential for tourism development, and the islands are publicly considered as great tourism 
potential, a ‘Baby-Boracay’. However, an absence of guidelines for distinguishing between 
support to private and public initiatives is experienced to make the use of financial and 
technical support from government to private initiatives ambiguous. Other resource 
exploitation are captured by the stakeholder alliances, including metal salvaging, where many 
island residents are hired to dive, financed by a few individuals. In addition, classification of 
land areas has become a battleground for political strategies, as local officials use the 
classification to manipulate the view of the state of land management, e.g. ranking forested 
land as grasslands to be able to clear cut the area without repercussions. This is further 
complicated by the fact that delineations between public and private/communal forest land is 
not in place. 
 
With the Fisheries Code, the policy for the creation of Fisheries and Aquatic Resource 
Management Councils (FARMCs), Executive Order 241 of 1995, was one of the key 
priorities for fisherfolk organizations. The formalisation of local management bodies was 
heralded as a major victory for local resource users, institutionalizing their role in community-
based planning and policy implementation and mandating representation of fisherfolk in 
barangay and municipal decision-making [61]. However, mirroring the pattern at national 
level, several island associations and management initiatives have dissolved or discontinued 
following municipal elections as political sponsors of the associations left offices. In addition 
to the cash-strapped financial conditions of LGUs nationwide to implement local programmes 
[1], isolationist strategies enforced by stakeholder alliances can effectively curb collaboration 
between FARMCs and sub-national arms of line agencies. Elites may selectively silence 
public discussions on contested resource access and management in order to maintain their 
status as well as relationship with parts of the constituency.  
 
Scattered and often opposing forces of government and NGO efforts for organizing the 
communities mean that many externally initiated organizations have stagnated as ‘shell 
organisations’ at the barangay level, for instance the FARMCs are largely inactive throughout 
the province (as in Manalili [62]). Joint actions in Camiguin are frequently undermined by 
infighting between the different elite factions and lack of accountability in economic 
management has led to the closure of several community-based organizations after member 
protests. FARMCs have to be initiated by respective level of government and have only 
advisory functions. In the province, few LGUs allocate the required funds to the FARMC as 
stipulated in the Fisheries Code because local chief executives do not see the value of the 
FARMC initiative. Elsewhere [10], it took the election of a new administration before the M-
FARMCs would be endowed with the necessary financial resources to take on an active role. 
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Also the multi-stakeholder platform Calayan Environmental Council (CEC) led by Isla is 
struggling to find backing amongst municipal executives.  
 
Scott [63, p. 6] has described the irony in the use of the term barangay i  Philippine politics; 
today it is the lowest form of formal government, but the native meaning was a ‘political unit 
loyal to one boss’ (datu). The leadership of such elite datus, or strongmen, in stakeholder 
alliances can still be discerned. They are prominent figures in daily politics representing the 
larger alliance, which is not necessarily synonymous with a clearly defined political unit. 
Strongmen champion localised management practices which often conflict with the views of 
other stakeholders, e.g. through the sponsoring of logging and fishing activities. These 
practices are characterised by the exertion of powers and influences by the elites, which often 
run against the publicly espoused values.  
 
Actual mandates and access rights are often-times negotiated through an unregulated and 
untransparent system of checks and balances. Strongmen use verbal threats and insults to 
patronize people and carry their will through and disposing of government and parish 
resources. Intruders from other municipalities together with international poachers dismantle 
communities into competing factions which can employ tactics such as bribery, intimidation 
or threat. Thus co-opting the envisioned transformation embodied in the ICM framework, 
strongmen and alliances are the de facto owners of the use of the coastal resources in 
Camiguin. Local enforcement staff is anxious for retaliation in return for their partaking in 
official duties such as collecting dynamited fish specimen or reporting of legal offences, and 
barangay citizens fear punishments if disclosing information to outsiders (see also Acebes et 
al. [64]). 
 
Yet, in a commentary on local politics, an anonymous historian from Mindanao State 
University suggests that it is hardly fair ‘to judge local political leaders using Manila 
standards: The concept of the state is not well developed…that is why people find more 
security in their clan or datus…Using public funds and equipment for private use may not be 
seen as a criminal act but as the normal exercise of authority of the datu’ [65, p. 297]. This 
patronage role is prevailing – in the words of one PGU official, when explaining this 
behaviour in Cagayan: ‘We are dealing with traditional…or “modernizing” politicians. The 
former is easier to understand, while the latter…brought physical development to their turf as 
a proof of service, wherever it came from, or in whatever process it came through. That’s the 
remaining downside of governance devolution. The financial pie was not included in the 
downloading of political power…The term participatory governance is not crucial for a 
modernizing politico while a “no-no” to a traditional politico. What is crucial is what can be 
delivered to his turf’. 
 
3.4 Beneficiaries and victims 
The main beneficiaries of the distorted transformation process and collapse of the owners’ 
worldview are the local elite alliances which capture the resource access and control. 
However, the patronage is not limited to the island or municipality. Local alliances are 
rumoured to be connected to other strongmen nationally and even outside national borders. 
Agency staff commonly experience apprehended Taiwanese fishermen claiming protection by 
officers in the Philippine military (known as a system of padrinos). This parallels experiences 
from the Philippine forestry sector, where Vitug [66] has described how resource access has 
been and still is a source of political patronage, with army officers exerting significant 
influence and tenuring large concessions. The notion of alliances thus may be seen as 
capturing the modern form of datu-power, which in its historical form goes back to the pre-
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colonial era [20]. Contrary to the 16th century Philippine society, however, today the politics 
has evolved from localised to a highly networked form, giving way to complex politico-
corporate-family based relationships which prosper from their informal influence. The 
resource access releases monetary gains, which in the clientalist democratic system of the 
Philippines can be used to attract voters during elections, and govern their respective 
territories [see also 67, 10].  
 
Meanwhile, Camiguin residents, who were the expected beneficiaries of the transformation, 
become the victims of the distorted implementation process. Fisherfolk depend on a 
composite livelihood from forest products, back-yard farming and coastal resources but lack 
other income sources outside the fishing and farming seasons [see also 29]). As a relatively 
isolated island community, they cannot as poor fishing communities elsewhere in the 
Philippines benefit from additional commercial activities geared to tourists or passersby’s to 
make ends meet in the household economy. Further, the malfunctions in the legal system and 
uncertainties associated with the actions of the stakeholder alliances undermine household 
economy, for instance when catches confiscated due to suspicions of illegal fishing practices 
are lost in the absence of trial.  
 
Kagawads and medical staff in all three Camiguin barangays complain over lacking social 
service delivery including medical supplies and basic health services. There is a limited 
economic cohesion in the barangays of Camiguin with a near-zero internal tax return from, 
for instance, sari-sari store permits and fees levied on nets within the barangays. Despite the 
decline in fish stocks, fish prices have remained unchanged whilst fuel prices have been 
surging. Middle men operate a credit system which mortgage farmers through advance 
payment credits in order to procure farming equipment and fertilisers. Due to the weakness of 
the public service delivery, the role of so-called breadwinners (resourceful persons who can 
support less advantaged relatives and friends) is important in the barangays. This is partly a 
consequence of the collapse of the management regime and the associated importance of the 
family and social relationships.  
 
The vulnerability of the island residents and their natural resources is acknowledged by the 
PGU which is implementing training programmes on livelihoods in Camiguin. BFAR and 
neighbouring municipalities are similarly engaged in efforts for livelihoods development [29]. 
However, whilst local and provincial government is running a number of programmes 
creating incentives for shifting production patterns, e.g. via free certified rice seeds or 
financial credits to farmers, executives lack capacity to conduct more radical interventions in 
managing the price levels or increase the service delivery. They also fear stirring protests and 
criticisms for favouritism from parts of the constituency. 
 
4. Discussion  
The evidence from the Babuyan Islands suggests that the transformation process towards re-
creating balanced coastal ecosystems for the benefit of poor fisherfolk is undermined due to 
the collapse of the policy owners’ worldview in the face of diverging stakeholder agendas and 
local innovation from resourceful elites. The expected actors are disempowered by the 
incoherence between the underlying assumptions in ICM of the possibility to enforce the idea 
of expert-defined ecosystem equilibrium and the reality faced by local stakeholders, which 
paves the way for the dominance of unethical alliances and strongmen. The ultimate 
beneficiaries of the distorted transformation process are elite alliances, with resulting 




Balgos [1, p. 972] argues that ‘the unabated degradation of the marine environment and its 
resources continue to motivate efforts to improve the existing paradigm’. However, as 
evidenced above, the fundamental disagreements on plausible knowledge claims positions 
ICM far from a ‘normal’ coherent and internally consistent knowledge paradigm. Thus, there 
is no ICM paradigm in the Kuhnian sense in Babuyan Islands [68]. Arguably, the islands have 
not yet seen the implementation of any large scale ICM programme which could have 
alleviated some of the challenges encountered as it has been reported from other localities. 
However, the disempowerment of the line agencies and government administrations serve to 
explain why ICM programmes remain generally unsustainable after their termination [22, 2]. 
As elsewhere, sub-national management authorities frequently find themselves disempowered 
in the messy reality ‘political infighting, technical errors, and ensuing misinformation’ [69, p. 
812, 2]. This is also manifested in the nationwide challenges in institutionalising people's 
participation in decision-making and the formal recognition of community organizations [70, 
21]. 
 
Whilst the last decade has seen an extensive debate within international development 
regarding the appropriate linkages between decentralisation and devolution, the academic 
literature on co-management in the Philippines scarcely distinguishes between these two 
processes. The typical distinction is as offered by Enters et al. [71], namely that 
decentralisation denotes the relocation of administrative functions away from the state centre, 
whereas devolution refers to the relocation of authority/power. With this lens it is commonly 
argued that South East Asian government reforms have frequently seen a decentralisation of 
administrative burden without the devolution of authority to enable sub-national levels to 
participate in meaningful decision making and resource allocation. However, this case 
suggests that the Philippines ICM regime, in contrast, suffers from the opposite imbalance, 
namely an extensive devolution of powers to the provincial and municipal levels to interpret 
state legislation without the associated decentralisation of administrative procedures to hold 
provincial and municipal stakeholders accountable. Yet, this case study sheds new light 
subtler dimensions of what constitutes governance ‘devolution’. Despite formal mandates and 
fiscal autonomy The continued centralised control over policy formulation undermines the 
ability of provincial and municipal actors to co-define and collectively own the goals and 
assumptions underlying IMC.  
 
In integrated resource management in wide sense, three mainstream categories of policy 
instruments have been highlighted which represent knowledge prescriptive approaches to 
policy implementation, namely normalisation of practices (coercion), regulation of the market 
through economic incentives, and awareness raising [35]. Based on the evidence presented 
above, it is questionable whether the ICM regime as implemented in Babuyan Islands moves 
beyond such knowledge prescription to truly non-coercive measures which allow a collective 
construction of the goals of local ICM. Irrespective of the acclaimed devolution, it thus 
maintains an attempt to separate the decision and policy making (‘steering’) from the 
implementation (‘rowing’).  
 
Whilst stakeholders are invited into negotiating management arrangements through, for 
instance, mechanisms for community organizing and participatory planning, the ICM 
planning model used by the Philippine Government [12, 3] perpetuates the underlying 
assumptions of ICM, including the expert driven undisputable ontology, which supposes the 
existence of equilibrium ecosystem states. This means that ICM programmes evoke an 
instrumental approach to stakeholder involvement which places undue emphasis on how 
coastal stakeholders can be players in formalising the implementation of already established 
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assumptions of ICM [13]. In the case of Babuyan Islands this serves to compromise formal 
collaboration between people caught in divisive alliance politics and to maintain the 
intransparent and unethical control exercised by the elite alliances. 
 
Le Tissier and Hills [72] have argued that capacity building for ICM must rely more on a 
holistic picture of governance aiming to create mechanisms for appreciating multiple 
stakeholder perspectives of what constitutes good management, rather than simplistic rational 
scientific measures. In Cagayan Province, one official example of enacting this principle is 
found in the establishment of a provincial office to support the development of local 
governance in barangays and municipalities. The People’s Action Center (PAC) was 
instituted by the Governor in May 2007 in response to the gaps exposed in implementation of 
the LGC. Following the Governor’s provincial agenda Municipal Development Facilitators 
have been recruited for 145 barangays in the Province and are mandated to enable barangays 
and other frontliners in the democratisation of the efforts for livelihoods improvement [73]. 
 
In the Philippine forestry sector, which served as inspiration for the country’s ICM regime, 
the transition from state-controlled to community-based management has also frequently been 
compromised by fragile assumptions promoted by the state to control the forests. This is 
manifested in reductionist conceptions of the ‘community’ as a stakeholder unit which ignores 
local groups’ multiple identities [74]. It echoes concerns from other resource management 
experiences regarding the hiding of persistent ‘fence-and-fines’ management strategies behind 
a popular narrative of ‘partnership’ [75, 76]. There has, indeed, globally been growing 
awareness of how environmental policy often relies on environmental definitions created by 
cultural and/or scientific elites and imposed in a local setting, leading to marginalisation of 
local stakeholders [77, 78]. Within the conservation movement at large these critics, at times 
as part of the global deliberative struggle to redefine the environmental movement [79], argue 
that ethical values are being co-opted by a positivist scientific and economic rationality, 
which removes environmental action from the public realm [80, 81].  
 
The attempt to formalise and legitimise the ICM regime and its assumptions through 
instrumental stakeholder involvement is visible in the claims that failure of ICM programmes 
results from lacking awareness of the LGC responsibilities amongst LGUs [82] and that there 
is a need to increase social acceptance of ICM [1]. This problem definition is extended to 
arguing that due to the diversity of stakeholder agendas, effective participation must be built 
strategically so as not to halt the overall process of the project, e.g. through alliances with 
supportive leaders [12]. If this means avoiding a collective localised critique of the 
assumptions of the ICM regime, then there is a risk that such endeavours may further deepen 
the dominating role of international development banks, foreign aid agencies, and NGOs in 
promoting the worldview embedded in the ICM regime which frames development from 
specific neo-liberal premises [83, 67]. It also risks playing into the hands of local elites whose 
priorities often are contrary to that of the intended beneficiaries of ICM.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has illustrated that in localities such as the Babuyan Islands, the assumptions 
perpetuated by the ICM worldview collapse with destructive consequences for its victims and 
the envisioned sustainable development for the Philippine coastal environment. If ICM is to 
foster an effective and equitable correction of current unsustainable exploitation patterns, then 
there is a need to institute improved accountability mechanisms in the devolved governance 
system. This may partly be achieved through linking the devolution of authority over the 
interpretation of policy goals more closely to a decentralisation of regulatory functions. 
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However, such a strategy would also require that the espoused commitment to stakeholder 
involvement in determining the goals and assumptions of ICM is taken seriously by state, 
NGOs and international development organizations. This could contribute to alleviate the 
current vacuum established in the meeting between detrimental assumptions of ICM, which 
are held as non-negotiable by its centralised owners, and the extensive governance devolution 
which allows the undermining of coastal management when stakeholder involvement breaks 
down due to a lack of ownership in the periphery. Arguably, collective ownership ought to go 
hand in hand with mutual accountability. 
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Table and Figure Captions 
 
Fig. 1: Geographical location of Babuyan Islands in Northern Philippines (Courtesy of 
Leonard Soriano). The Babuyan Islands consists of the five main islands of Calayan, 
Camiguin, Dalupiri, Fuga and Babuyan Claro. Calayan Municipality has jurisdiction over the 
vast majority of the islands and their waters, including Camiguin Island. The Municipality is 
located in Cagayan Province of Region 2 of the Philippines.  
 
Box 1: TWOCAGES, Mnemonic Soft Systems Tool (from Checkland [46], adapted from 
Powell et al. [47]) 
 
 
Box 1  
 
 
T- Transformation – details of the proposed change (protection and rehabilitation of coastal 
biodiversity) 
W- Worldview – the particular view that makes change meaningful to the “owner” of the 
process. (rehabilitate and protect coastal ecosystems and biodiversity, incl. for the benefit of 
the poor fisherfolk). 
O- Owners – have the authority to authorise the change (Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources, and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) 
C- Clients – these are beneficiaries or victims of the change (Fisherfolk, elite, investors, 
patrons). 
A – Actors – those implementing the change (Local GU, Provincial GU, NGOs, line agencies 
BFAR and DENR). 
G- Guardians- those who watch or monitor for unintended outcomes of the change (in this 
case the planning project). 
E – Environment – The operating environment in which a change is being undertaken (in this 
case the governance trends of devolution and co-management).  
S- The system of interest bounded by change related issues identified by the clients (to be 
discussed below). 
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